nary one on 'em. I ask'd some on 'em there why they did'nt go to work and earn an honest livin' and put on decent clothes, and feed their starvin families—but they said there was'nt no use in tryin' that, for as soon as any man got a leetle before-handed in the world, all their property was taken away from 'em to feed the sogers, or pay taxes, or was stolen.—Well, says I, why don't you take the law on 'em then? Law! What Law? There ain't no law here, but just sich law as "the Government" chuses to make—and "the Government" has got all the sogers and all the office holders on their side, and they outnumber us two to one. Well thinks I, as far as that goes, that *sounds* democratic at any rate, but shows the difference between a "Government democracy" and a "people's democracy." And this put me to thinkin' considerable how it comes about in the course of time that a Government can manage to work along, first with power granted by the people for the good of the hull people, and then sometimes with a leetle glory, (for Spain has had its glory too, and is now so full on't there ain't no vessels in port, or industry in the country—there ain't no room for any thing but rag—and misery,) and then agin, with a leetle party management, contrive to bring things so as to make power, and smash every thing that dares to talk agin the power that has the control.

And what is the consequence? All the laws that were made for the good of the hull people are put aside, and only sich laws are made as suit the party in power,—that party has got all the offices, and got all the hard money,—and they won't allow any other kind of money,—they won't encourage commerce, or trade, or manufacturing—because they know that trade and commerce, and manufacturing would create a power right off that would upset their apple-cart. These callings would at once create a credit money mixed up with coin, and every man of good character would come in for a share on't, and borrow upon his credit a leetle somethin' till his labor would lift him out of the dirt and rags he is now in. Trade and commerce too sharpen the wits of folks generaliy, and makes 'em keep a sharp eye on the law makers—and that don't suit some folks. I have always noticed myself, and I have heard tell ever since I was a boy—and what leetle I read of what is called history says so too—that no country can be free and happy without good laws, made expressly for all classes alike—then all classes prosper—for all are dependent on each other,—a farmer raises wheat, and pork, and beef—the merchant takes these to all parts of creation to the best market, and brings home what is most wanted in turn. The ship-builder builds ships for the market, and that gives employ to rope-makers, and blacksmiths, and sail-makers and cartmen—and so on through all branches of mechanics. Foreign trade and home trade all goes on one working into the other—merchandize and folks in steam boats and on rail roads, keep movin' about the country—all busy, all happy, all prosperous. But when, to suit some party purposes, any man, or set of men, in office or out of office, finding some of their measures ain't likely to suit any particular class of folks, begin to throw mud at 'em, and try to set up other folks agin 'em, depend on't there's mischief brewin', and the sooner it is check'd the better. What is "sass for the goose ought to be sass for the gander." It may suit a party to-day to abuse the merchants and men in trade, and smash 'em all to flinders,—and to-morrow, it may suit the same party to smash the farmers—and the next, the mechanics, and so on. If it is right in one case, it is right in all, but my notion is, it ain't right in any case, and I for one, won't vote for it. A man who builds a ship for the merchant, has as good a claim on the protection of the laws, as the man who labors at any other honest callin', I don't care in what. Will any man pint out in the Constitution, or in any other law, the right of sowing discord in the great national family?

A good deal is said about some private letters from the Gineral at the Hermitage—that he wrote to the Globe man at Washington. I haint had time yet to read 'em, but if they are what I hear tell'd on, I don't believe the Gineral ever wrote 'em—and if he did, it don't amount to nothin' What a man writes *afore* he is President and what he writes *after* he has quit that office, amounts pritty much to the same thing. The Gineral writ a very good letter once to Mr. Munroe, but it did not come to any good. One man's letter, then, is just as good as any other man's letter. Take Gineral Harrison, now for instance—let him write a letter—I dont think it would make the day longer or shorter; but make him President, and then all his letters, so long as he is President, would be considered by many as very important; and some would think the world was just beginning, and some that it was just ending. This shows then there must be something in the office; it may be the $25,000 a year, and a big house free of rent, and the right of nominating folks to office or something else, I don't know what—but there is something that makes his *notions* better or sounder than before. Well then when he quits office, I don't see why he should take all the mother wit he found there along with him; he should leave it where he found it, for the next. I ain't one of those kind of folks that think the world is comin to an end by the *notions* of any man, who ain't President—whether written before or arter—my letter then is jest as good as his'n, and I don't know but it is a leetle better, for I hain't got no party notions to sarve, and no mistakes to kiver up.

Capt. Jumper, too, I hear, has been writin' a letter to the editor of the "Saco Gazette," about the "Two Pollies" gittin ashore. I understand he lays it all to the crew, and winds up by sayin' that arter all there's no safety in any kind of vessel, and goes agin the hull scrape on 'em, and advises that the Government should cut adrift from every thing that floats—that all vessels are dangerous—apt to leak—apt to sink—apt to upset—and apt to go ashore. The fact is, the old Captain never did know much about navigation, unless he had land in sight, or could reach it with a lead line—but he thought he did—and the "Two Pollies" tells the rest of the story—and it is pretty much so with the Gineral's Banking and money notions,—he, like Capt. Jumper, made a mistake—and to kiver it up turns to and blows up the hull business. Well, what does it amount to?

I look upon a President or any other man in high office, jist as I look upon a juryman. What his notions are *afore* he takes the oath, and what his notions are *arter* the verdict is brought in, aint nigh so important as *when he is in the jury box*,—he is responsible then, and then only. If he has notions contrary to the natur of the oath he is obliged to take, and goes on a jury with two faces—he may escape *here*, but he will want more than two faces *hereafter*. A President in office has nothing to do with what he had said afore he took the oath of office—and folks had'nt ought to keep twitin' him about it; it would be a pritty matter for a lawyer in court, when pleadin' his case to a jury, to put his eye on some juryman and say, Mr. So-and-so, you remember last October, when you and I was talkin over the matter, you said then my side of the question was right,—now do you see that you stick to it." I don't know what would be done in these parts—but I don't know a man in all Downingville that would not hop out of a jury box and thrash any lawyer for saying so, if the case war'nt more than for ten dollars,—and 'Squire Joslin would lend him a hand if he had to adjourn the court for it—and is a President's oath no tighter than a Juryman's oath?

But I find I am away off from what I wanted to put into this letter, and so I'll put it in my next. I see no way tho' of gittin at what I am arter till folks can look at things strait in the face without any party squintin' and I will then show them why our country is not like Spain and other countries. But if we don't look out sharp, we shall soon be exactly like them. The next thing is to show my plan for gittin' the Two Pollies afloat agin. I think I can do this without askin' any appropriation from Congress; all I want is, for Congress to give me the liberty to try my plan, and if I succeed, let me have a patent for it. She must be got off this season at any rate, or I won't answer for consequences—I don't mean to offer any notion that I don't think is sound at both eends; and I hope that as I hain't been many rods wide of the mark in the way of guessing what was to happen, that all on you will keep an eye to what I shall say, and have a leetle patience, and let me say it in my own way. I'll square the log afore I have done with it; but we have got to score the bark off first, and draw the chalk lines, or else we shall run the risk of doing what old Deacon Knowles did when he thought he could square a door post as well as a carpenter—he took a stick of timber two and twenty inches and three-quarters in diameter,—(pritty much like the Gineral's experiment in banking—he hewed and scored and dub'd without rule or chalk line, till there war'nt a piece big enuff to make a button for a hen-house door. Your friend,

J. DOWNING, Major,
2d Brigade, Downingville Militia.

THE MISSISSIPPI ELECTIONS.

Last summer the Governor of Mississippi issued his proclamation for the election of two members of Congress to fill vacancies in that body until the regular election in November. The whole canvass was conducted by both parties on the ground, that the candidates, who might be elected, would be entitled to their seats no longer than that time, and the people voted under that impression. Messrs. Claiborne and Gholson were the successful candidates, and they considered themselves elected to serve only till November. Immedia tely after their election, the editor of the Mississippian, the organ of iheir party, again placed their names at the head of his columns as the candidates to be supported at the November election. He kept their names in that position for several weeks, but we perceive, that he has at length, without any assigned cause, withdrawn them. We have no difficulty in understanding this movement. The Van Buren managers in Mississippi, catching eagerly at a suggestion in some of the late papers from the East, are determined to insist, that Claiborne and Gholson, notwithstanding the express understanding of the people to the contrary, are already elected for two years, and, that there can be no election in November. They are afraid to risk a trial in November; they see and know, that they have not the strength to cope with the Whigs at that time, and hence they are resolved to give to the late election a construction which they never thought of giving it, and which the people never thought of giving it when the vote of the State was taken. We know little, very little, of Messrs. Claiborne and Gholson, but, if they have the slightest portion of the spirit of men—if they have the least respect for themselves or the shadow of regard for the rights of the people and the principles of honor and honesty, they will disdain to hold their seats longer than November, whatever may be the decision of Congress as to their power to do so under the laws of their State and of the country. If they attempt to cling to their offices for two years in virtue of their late election, they will be forever sunk, in the estimation of all honorable men, to an immeasurable depth of political or personal infamy, and the aroused indignation of their outraged constituents will not be long in sweeping them and the miserable cause which they advocate from off the face of the earth.—*Louisville Journal.*

LIBERTY ADVOCATE

LIBERTY, OCTOBER 3, 1837.

The President's message is entirely too lengthy for publication in our little sheet. The necessity, however, for publishing it will be superseded by the numerous extracts we shall make from it, and from its publication in the various newspapers subscribed for in our county. We are pleased with the communication of *Junius* on the subject, and invite the undivided attention of our readers to his article. The author is one of the most profound men in the State, and has never mingled in the party politics of the day; he has been a silent observer of passing events, his own neighbors not even knowing how nor for whom he voted. But now that he sees our currency destroyed, the whole country plunged into ruin and bankruptcy, and an attempt making by those who impiously style themselves democrats, to unite the purse and the sword in the hands of the Executive, he, like a true patriot, has taken a stand in defence of his injured country's rights. When such men as Junius buckle on their armor, the example should incite every man, who wishes correct principles to triumph over humbuggery, to redoubled action; it calls loudly upon the hardy yeomanry of the country to rise in their might and sweep from the stage those little *letter-writing* demagogues who are pandering to their passions and prejudices for their own elevation. Junius has promised to continue his remarks until the election. He is welcome, thrice welcome to our columns. *Publisher.*

COMMUNICATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

This is a very lengthy communication on a single subject. As to language, it is well expressed; as to substance or practical purpose, a rare specimen of *parvum in multo*, for a state paper from such a source. We look into it in vain for any proposed measure, worthy of the call of Congress, from the four corners of the Union, under a burning August sun. It is true, certain things are recommended to keep the Government in motion, and regulate its course. But how long will it move to advantage, if the main spring of action be suffered to lose its elasticity?—if the pecuniary power of the people become more and more parlyzed, under the protracted pressure of a disordered currency?

There is a material difference between a pressure from the want of money, and a pressure from the want of *current* money. This distinction is best illustrated by actual fact, by a case in point. In the late scarcity, a planter went about fifty miles to a town on the Mississippi, with bank notes which were quite current a week or two before, to purchase a load of corn, and returned home with an empty wagon, from the want of hard money. There may have been many other similar hard cases; but we all know that this essential article could not be obtained with our paper money, but at an enormous discount.

Only two instances of pressure from the want of *current* money, are within the knowledge of the writer hereof. One was in our last war with England; the other now exists. Pressures from the want of all sorts of money, have been of more frequent occurrence. There was one a few years after the close of the war, which seemed to be severely felt in some States, especially in South Carolina. And there was another of more notoriety, if not of more severity, about the time of the removal of the Deposites, the cause of which was a question of much debate and recrimination. A pressure from mere scarcity of the circulating medium, though severe and injurious, is not generally lasting, and may relieve itself without legislative remedy. But it is hard to say, when, or how, a disordered, depreciated currency may be restored to a healthy state and wonted value. Legislative provision was deemed indispensable to a restoration of the currency in the last war, and hence the institution of the late Bank of the United States. Soon after its establishment the local banks began to resume specie payments, and it was not long before the circulating medium every where obtained again the confidence of the community. This happy renewal of confidence gave fresh vigor to industry and trade; and the new National Bank was considered a very efficient fiscal agent of the Government, as well as the restorer and conservator of the currency of the country. Of its great usefulness in answering these important ends, there seemed to be no doubt, until general Jackson came into the presidency. The opposition which then arose against this institution, is too well known to require explanation.

There is nevertheless a great proportion of the nation, whose faith in a National Bank has never been shaken; and it embraces men of high character and standing, who would well sustain a comparison with Mr. Van Buren, on the score of either talents or patriotism, that do look upon such an institution with intense anxiety, as the only practicable measure that can be adopted with a prospect of success, to extricate the country from the embarrassments of the present pressure. The President, however, strenuously persists in opposing such a measure, without proposing, or even suggesting, any other for the same end. The truth is, Mr. Van Buren finds himself in a tight place in relation to this question. However clearly he may *now* perceive the expediency or necessity of a National Bank, he knows not how to acknowledge it, partly on account of his being pledged to oppose it, but principally because he fears to deviate one step from the course marked out for him by his predecessor. The Hermitage is, virtually, still the source of a controlling executive influence; and here, rather than with the people, lies the effective opposition to a National Bank.

This state of things between the late and present executive, places the country in a deplorable condition at this trying crisis. The latter cannot brook the displeasure of the former; and hence arises an insuperable obstacle to the adoption of a remedy for the disordered state of the currency, which proved successful in a similar case on a former occasion. Less difficulty would be found in the fact, that Mr. Van Buren is committed on the question by his declared hostility to a Bank of the United States. He is a man who can change with circumstances; and he might avail himself of a great example, which it would be no discredit to him to follow. This has been set by Mr. Madison on a similar question, and in a very similar case. Mr. Madison also had committed himself on the question of a National Bank, when it was agitated for the first time under our federal government; and when that question came up again, after a lapse of more than twenty years, he was President of the United States. There was his celebrated speech against the first bank, presented in print, and staring him in the face, when the bill for the late bank was presented for his approval. What man on earth could be more careful of consistency of conduct than Mr. Madison, who was the principal architect in the design and erection of our political edifice, and one of the most dignified and disinterested statesmen that ever lived? Yet he was ready to sacrafice the pride of opinion to the good of his country. He saw in a disordered currency, and an empty treasury, the necessity for such an institution as a National Bank, and he hesitated not to give it his sanction.

But Mr. Van Buren says, that a large majority of the people are deliberately and decidedly opposed to a national bank. This I do not believe. There have always been many public men, chiefly of the Virginia School, who were in principle averse to such an institution, and would on the proper occasion speak or vote against it; but they were temperate men, and did not feel it their duty to agitate the country or the question. As to the people at large, in private life, although I have seen many of them in most of the States, I have no recollection of hearing one of them express a sentiment hostile to a Bank of the United States. After the late Bank was established, I had still no small opportunity of learning the public opinion on the subject; and it is not within my memory, that I heard a single private individual complain of the measure. I believe no act of Congress ever produced less discontent. The people were satisfied with the relief which the Bank afforded them; and so they remained until the late President made war upon the institution. The effect of this, however, was not a change of opinion, but a change of feeling—not conviction, but excitement, which became contagious, and infected the politics of the day. Nor did political adventurers fail to avail themselves of this morbid state of the public mind. Declamation, destitute of reason and fact, roused up the passions of a party, and soon a tempest ensued. The truth of the matter is just this—General Jackson virtually put the elements in commotion, and Mr. Van Buren rode bravely on the storm.

There is probably more in this call of Congress than the message shows. The country is restless under the existing pressure, and anxious for relief. Mr. Van Buren is not so much inclined as his predecessor to assume responsibility from the mere love of control, and therefore is disposed, in critical cases, to shift it from his own to the shoulders of Congress If they relieve the country, it is well. If as is probable, they fail to do so, he can then say, It was my duty to convene them, and theirs to act. But see how their action is directed, and how it may be confined. He says to them, *in substance*: There are such and such things (which he sufficiently explains) that should be done for the support and convenience of Government—as to the relief of private individuals, the great body of the people, it is your province, not mine, to devise an expedient for their case; but should this expedient be a National Bank, I tell you beforehand, that it will be denied you, if my veto can prevail. JUNIUS.

DEATH OF COL. CLAIBORNE!

The following confirms the report that this "*poor orphan boy*" is dead—dead.—"Ye who have tears to shed," read:

From the Raymond Times.

COL. CLAIBORNE.

We find more and more reason for concluding that this gentleman has grossly deceived his constituents. The evidence comes in from various quarters, and we must give it, as the Doctors give Calomel, in broken doses.

TEXT.—"They charge me with inconsistency and deception on the Bank question. With a full sense of the responsibility incurred, I pronounce the charge false, and throw it in the teeth of any man who asserts it."—*Appeal to the Freemen of Mississippi.*

EVIDENCE.

"So far as I remember the tenor of his (Gen. H's letter, I concur entirely in its *tone* and *spirit*, but cannot adopt the remedy he suggests—the re-charter of the U. States Bank. *That proposition will never receive my vote.*"—*Ibid.*

"*Under* NO CIRCUMSTANCES, *gentlemen, will I vote for a Bank.* Let me hope your candidate will make an avowal to the public, either one way or the other, *equally explicit.* Are they for or against it?"—*Letter to the Committee at Columbus.*

From the Southern Whig.

JULY 14th, 1837.

"*My Dear Sir:* I am much disappointed in not seeing you. I am now on my way to Utica. Wherever I have been I have met with universal encouragement, and have no doubt of my re-election by 3000 votes. I have ever been opposed to the old Bank, because it was under British influence. I believe we should have a National Bank to regulate the currency, free equally from Executive influence and foreign control. Please explain my views to the people. I rely on Dr. Woodward and yourself to do this.

"Your friend truly,
"J. F. H. CLAIBORNE.

"To Mr. S. H. HERD."

From the Southerner.

AUBURN, Hinds co., Sept. 5, 1837.

To the Editor of the Southerner:

Dear Sir:—In regard to what occurred between Mr. Claiborne and myself on the Bank question, I will make a brief statement. On the Saturday previous to the election, Major Catlett called on me, and gave me a bundle of tickets. which he said Mr. Claiborne wished me to distribute at the ensuing election, and at the same time told me that Mr. C. would not be able to call on me personally, but that he wished me to understand that he was *in favor of a National Bank—not* a Biddle Bank, but *a Bank founded upon the Treasury*, with branches in the several States, as they were needed. I remarked to Major Catlett, that this would not satisfy me. I told him that I was a personal friend to Mr. Claiborne, but that I would not suffer my personal feelings to bias my vote; that at such a time as this I must be controlled by higher principles; that our country had exhibited unparallelled prosperity with *Biddle's* Bank as the organ of exchange, and that I did not think the system could be improved. About two hours after, Mr. Claiborne did call on me.

He told me that he was in favor of a National Bank. He asked me if I had seen Gen. Hamilton's letter; I replied that I had. He told me that he was in favor of the *principles* contained in that letter *throughout*. He wished me to say to the voters of this precinct, that he went to the fullest extent for the principles of that letter, and that he *ran upon that ground*. He said he did not pretend to be a great financier, but was willing to join cordially with the great statesmen of the day in relieving the country from its embarrassments. That he being a planter, was as much interested in it as any one. He went still further, and said he was in favor of *having the accruing Deposites placed in the present United States Bank*, as a temporary measure of relief for the purpose of restoring confidence, until something more effectual could be devised and adopted. And he pledged himself to me, that within ten days after the opening of Congress, provided he was elected, and in case no other member moved the subject, he would himself make a motion to that effect. Perhaps, said I, if it should be thought best to take up and re-charter the present United States Bank of Pennsylvania, you would support the measure. He assured me positively and unequivocally, that he would. I told him that I was very glad of having had this interview with him, for if I had not, I should have voted against him.

On the succeeding Monday, at the polls, I stated to the voters the subject of this conversation. I told them that I was perfectly satisfied with Mr. Claiborne's principles respecting a National Bank; that he had conceded every thing that I could